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Abstract 
 
Harris’ reply to our defence of NICE’s current cost-effectiveness procedures contains 
two further errors. First, he wrongly draws from the fact that NICE does not and 
cannot evaluate all possible uses of health care resources at any one time and 
generally cannot know which NHS activities will be displaced or which groups of 
patients will have to forgo health benefits the inference that no estimate is or can be 
made by NICE of the benefits to be forgone. This is a non sequitur. Second, he asserts 
that it is a flaw at the heart of the use of QALYs as an outcome measure that 
comparisons between people need to be made. Such comparisons do indeed have to 
be made but this is not a consequence of the choice of any particular outcome 
measure, whether the QALY or anything else.  
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We are heartened that Harris accepts our characterisation of the allocation problem in 
health care, whether the good of health is defined as health gain (measures by QALYs 
or other metric) or some other, as yet to be clearly defined, rights based measure. [1] 
The disagreement now only turns on two issues: one we believe to be an 
epistemological misunderstanding the other a more substantive and widely debated 
issue about the measure of the good of health care.   
 
1.  Absurdly abusive 
 
Firstly, we have no comment make on the balance of corporate vs personal abuse 
within these recent exchanges.  Our own view is that those responsible for corporate 
policy are also morally accountable for and personally answerable to criticisms and 
moral condemnation of such policies. Others may differ. We are content for readers of 
the exchange to come to their own view of the absurdity of our interpretation of the 
previous editorials and the distinctions offered - with or without the assistance of the 
Oxford English Dictionary. We also leave readers to judge whether NICE’s attempts 
to follow their consciences and the instructions of the Secretary of State by having 
regard to citizens’ values are fairly described as “populist”. 
 
 
2. Cost-effectiveness 
 
Of more substance is the apparent confusion about how decisions of cost-
effectiveness can be made in a health care system like the NHS. Harris suggests that 
our paper implies that, “no estimate is or can be made by NICE of the benefits to be 
forgone”, and therefore, “NICE, in the expert opinion of Claxton and Culyer, cannot 
and is not making its decisions on the basis of cost-effectiveness.”[1] 
 
To support this Harris quotes and is referring to the following passage by us, “NICE 
does not and cannot evaluate all possible uses of health care resources at any one time 
and generally cannot know which NHS activities will be displaced or which groups of 
patients will have to forgo health benefits. Harris is certainly correct about this. But 
what may be inferred from this? Again it is not clear what he is arguing.”[2] Our 
question was somewhat rhetorical. We continued, “The two obvious possibilities are:  
• there will be no real costs because other activities will not be displaced and 
health benefits will not be forgone 
• because the individuals bearing the cost are unidentified and unknown these 
health or lost opportunities to benefit are less important or of no consequence 
compared to the groups of patents under consideration who may benefit from 
treatment.”[2]  
 
Our point was that neither NICE nor any other decision making entity, including a 
practising physician at the bed side, can know precisely which NHS activities will be 
displaced by their guidance or prescribing decisions nor exactly who will forgo which 
specific health benefits.  However, we do know there will be health forgone to real, 
albeit unidentified, patients and we maintain the value judgement that the 
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consequences for those unidentified individuals ought to be valued in the same way as 
the consequences for others who gain from the technology under consideration (or 
who are in the bed) and who are currently identified and known. 
 
Harris seems to have taken the obvious fact that no institution or individual can know 
at any one point in time precisely who will forgo a health benefit to imply that we 
have no way of assessing whether “the health benefits that it is estimated could be 
gained from the technology are less than those estimated to be forgone by other 
patients.”[1, 2] 
 
Such an estimate requires some knowledge of the health gained by some of the least 
productive (in health outcome terms) of the activities currently undertaken by the 
NHS. Therefore, to say we know nothing and have no estimate of the health forgone 
is to say we have no knowledge of the productivity of any NHS activities. This is 
absurd. NICE itself has generated substantial evidence of the cost-effectiveness of 
interventions currently undertaken (and not undertaken) within the NHS. There also a 
much wider body of evidence which can easily be accessed (e.g., the NHS Economic 
Evaluation Database). In addition NICE engages in a broad consultation process with 
all stakeholders, including the nation’s foremost clinical generalists, experts in the 
management of the diseases and treatments under examination, and the general 
public, to identify technologies for both investment and disinvestment.  The proposals 
obtained through the consultation process are reviewed by two expert committees; the 
Advisory Committee on Topic Selection (ACTS) and the Joint Planning Group  who 
bring their broad knowledge of the efficiency of a wide range of NHS interventions to 
the consideration of which therapies to put forward for review.  
 
This approach usually embodies the seemingly reasonable assumption that, where 
NICE has not identified a concurrent disinvestment, local decision makers in the NHS 
will in general curtail activities which provide less rather than more health gain. If in 
general they do not and, for example, displace activities at random, then the forgone 
health will be even higher than when only the least productive activities are carefully 
identified and displaced.  In these circumstances the estimate of the health forgone 
should be higher (reflecting the average rather than marginal productivity of health 
care) making it much less likely that interventions such as the drugs for Alzheimer’s 
disease or multiple cycles of IVF can be regarded as cost-effective. [3] 
 
There is a substantial literature addressing how these decisions can be made in these 
common circumstances including the NICE methods guidance itself.[4, 5]  Our 
mistake was to take this literature as read, which hardly amounts to a “fatal flaw”.  
 
There is an important debate and a body of literature about how decision makers 
within a health care system can improve decision making at a national and local level 
when they are uncertain about the gains from technologies and the forgone health 
benefit elsewhere.[5] Harris may have intended to point out that greater precision than 
that provided by current estimates would be valuable. He may also believe that the 
central estimate of what will be displaced may be incorrect. If so, we agree on both 
counts: generating information to inform the Institute (or other decision making 
entities) whether the guidance issued might displace more health than it generates (or 
vs versa) is obviously very important. At present, given the funding for the NHS and 
the difficulties faced by local commissioners and clinical governance managers, the 
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estimates of forgone health may be too low. So far as we are aware, no informed 
commentator is suggesting it is too high. However, if this is his concern then, by all 
accounts, the provisional guidance to withhold treatment for Alzheimer’s disease (a 
decision to which Harris objected and the origin of these exchanges) would have been 
more rather than less secure.   
 
We find it hard to believe that that Harris really holds that it is impossible to estimate 
what may be forgone within the health care system on the grounds that one cannot be 
precise about identities or quantities. We therefore conclude that his objection is 
based on a misunderstanding and are content to let readers judge whether there is a 
“fatal flaw” in our argument or - much more importantly - in the methods used by 
NICE to make its inevitably difficult decisions about health care priorities in an 
explicit and transparent way. 
 
 
3.  The good of health care  
 
Harris’ imaginary example of the twin sisters raises again two matters that are 
inherent in nearly all resource allocation decisions and have been the subject to a large 
and venerable literature.[6]  The first is that there are insufficient health care resources 
to permit all who may have Mars Jones’ “unfinished business” to be able to conclude 
it. This may mean that neither of the twins may receive care from which it is 
conceivable they may benefit or that both may, or that only one may. Harris refuses to 
take responsibility for the unavoidable choice he has posed, “it is unethical to choose 
between them…there is no rational basis for so doing”.[1] Abdication of 
responsibility for this decision does not mean it will not be made; instead both, neither 
or one will ultimately receive care based on some opaque and possibly arbitrary 
process and the cost in terms of lost lives (long or short) will be ignored.   
 
The other matter is the question of which, if only one can receive care, ought to have 
it. This is a question of interpersonal comparisons that the QALY methodology has 
starkly raised. It is not a “flaw at the heart of the QALYs”[1]1 that comparisons 
between people need to be made. The question of how best to make interpersonal 
comparisons is not one that is in any way specific to QALYs; it arises in virtually all 
comparisons of future health, whether measured by QALYs or in some other way 
including the sorts of measure preferred by Harris that are invariant with respect to 
life expectation. We count it as a virtue of the QALY method that it highlights the 
question and has enabled its extensive discussion in the QALY-related literature to 
which we referred in our previous comment - which has many more dimensions to it 
than that the potential “ageism” to which Harris attaches such signal importance. God 
has not granted the hours but he may be said to have granted society the right to make 
choices and the duty of taking responsibility for them. Although exercising these 
choices implicitly and opaquely might provide some comfort to decision makers and 
commentators it will serve neither accountability nor democracy – nor, we conjecture, 
social justice. 
 
It seems to us that the best way of handling such questions, once they have been 
identified and whatever evidence concerning them gathered and assessed, is by a 
deliberative process, despite the risk of being charged with “populism”. This is what 
NICE has done in response to the requirements of the Secretary of State. On some 
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such matters it has consulted its Citizens’ Council. Indeed NICE has recently 
consulted the Citizens Council on precisely the issues raised by Harris in his two 
examples.[7]  
 
The Citizens’ Council Report on the Rule of Rescue makes interesting reading.[7]  
They found precise and explicit definitions almost impossible and the trade-offs 
between ‘immediate risk’ and health gain to others even more difficult.  All members 
rejected a clearly defined rule of rescue (an imperative to save life) and focused 
instead on the circumstances when exceptions to decisions based on health gain could 
be made. A minority of the Council rejected any exceptions based on rescue; a 
majority suggested that concerns for rescue should not be completely rejected but 
should only be applied in exceptional circumstances. These circumstances include a 
“good probability of increased life expectancy” and “a significant improvement in 
quality of life”.  However, the council was unable to define, “good probability”, 
“increased life expectancy” or “significant improvement in quality”.  All agreed that 
any exceptions based on rescue should consider the opportunity costs (forgone health 
to others) but were unable to specify the trade off that should be made. One reason 
why the Citizens’ Council found it so difficult to provide precise and explicit answers 
to these questions is that they took their duty to explore fully the implications of 
holding particular views seriously.  
 
 
4. Rights and responsibilities 
 
All society ought to have the right to comment on the processes, deliberations and 
recommendations made by NICE on behalf of the NHS but those who exercise that 
right, and whose wish is to engage and inform the decision makers, commonly take 
responsibility for fully exploring the implications - for the whole of society - of the 
positions they hold. However, commentators who choose to abdicate this 
responsibility face no such discipline. Their reward is the freedom of the nihilist, who 
has no duty to offer alternative solutions let alone any that are precise, explicit, or 
fully explored. The defence of academic freedom, sometimes combined with 
pedantry, is always available to those who choose such a course – and it should be 
recognised for what it is.  
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